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A person may be put to the choice of either conforming to certain
religious tenets or losing a job opportunity, a promotion, or...
employment itself. The potential for coercion created by such a
provision is in serious tension with our commitment to individual
freedom of conscience in matters of religious belief.'
On December 7, 2000, St. Elizabeth Medical Center in Granite City,
Illinois asked Dr. Yogendra Shah to step down from his position as Chief of the
Department of Obstetrics-Gynecology because of pressure that the Catholic
hospital had begun to receive from the anti-abortion community. Dr. Shah
performed abortions at a private clinic across the street from the hospital, and
an increasingly vocal lobby viewed the employment of this doctor as a
violation of Catholic principles.
2
On March 19, 1998, Dr. David Mesches was forced out of his position as
the chairman of the Department of Family Medicine at New York Medical
College, a Roman Catholic-affiliated hospital and medical school in Kingston,
New York. Dr. Mesches, in a twist of irony, was attempting to assist in
completing a merger between a Catholic hospital and two non-sectarian
hospitals in the area. The merger agreement required all three hospitals to bar
the performance of abortion and sterilization procedures. As a result, Dr.
Mesches had agreed to lease space in his offices in Kingston to a private clinic,
which would provide abortions and other women's health services that would
be restricted in the hospitals as a condition of the merger. When questioned
about this choice, Dr. Mesches commented to a local Kingston newspaper that
the right to abortion is "the law of the land" and added, "it's the right thing to
1. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. Amos, 483
U.S. 337, 340-41 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring). Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred in the
holding of Amos, which allowed religious institutions to be exempted from the non-discrimination
mandate of § 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 with respect to the hiring of employees for both
religious and secular positions, but were wary of the destructive effect this might have on the freedoms
of those employees. Brennan, although referring to a building engineer in a religiously affiliated
gymnasium in this quote, could just as easily be speaking of the problem of physicians at religiously
affiliated hospitals discussed in this paper. In his opinion, Justice Brennan also quoted James Madison
and the Virginia Declaration of Rights:
We hold it for a fundamental and undeniable truth that 'Religion or the duty which we owe to
our Creator and the Manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction,
not by force or violence.' The Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction and
conscience of every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate.
Id. at 341 n.2.
2. Heather Ratcliffe, Doctor Who Does Abortions at Clinic is Demoted by Catholic Hospital But He
Will Stay on Staff at St. Elizabeth in Granite City, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Dec. 21, 2000, at B2. See
also E-mail from Sally Burgess, Hope Clinic for Women, to author (Nov. 30, 2002) (on file with
author).
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do.",3  Soon after these remarks were published, Dr. Mesches was dismissed
from his position.4
In December of 1998, Dr. Schales Atkinson received a letter from the
Deaconess Hospital in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma indicating that in order to
grant him permanent medical staff privileges, the Methodist hospital required
him to sign a statement agreeing not to "intentionally perform any abortion
other than to save the life of the pregnant woman, at the Deaconess Hospital or
elsewhere.... ."S
INTRODUCTION
The above three examples illustrate a growing problem in the United States
as Catholic and other religious health care systems and institutions take on a
larger presence in the health care field and, as a result, exert enormous
influence over the health care of those they serve. Catholic and some other
religious hospitals restrict the services they provide in accordance with their
religious beliefs and doctrine. Catholic hospitals must all comply with the
National Conference of Bishops' Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic
6Health Care Services. These guidelines prohibit all forms of contraceptive
7 8services and counseling, as well as medical and surgical abortions,
sterilizations, 9 and even emergency contraception to victims of rape. °
The impact of these directives is widespread. Catholic hospitals are the
largest single group of non-profit hospitals, constituting, as of 2001, eleven
percent of all community hospitals and sixteen percent of all community
hospital admissions." In many rural areas, a Catholic hospital is often the only
3. Ian Fisher, Casualty of the Abortion Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1998, at BI. Dr. Mesches
later clarified that he meant that leasing the office space was the right thing to do and was not referring
to abortions in that statement.
4. Id.
5. Letter from Paul Dougherty, President, Deaconess Hospital, to Dr. Schales L. Atkinson (Dec.
11, 1998) (emphasis added) (on file with author).
6. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES FOR
CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE SERVICES (1995), available at http://www.ncc.buscc.org/bishopsl
directives.htm [hereinafter DIRECTIVES].
7. NAT'L WOMEN'S LAW CENTER, HOSPITAL MERGERS AND THE THREAT TO WOMEN'S
REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH SERVICES: USING CHARITABLE ASSETS LAWS TO FIGHT BACK 6 (2001)
[hereinafter HOSPITAL MERGERS]. See also DIRECTIVES, supra note 6, at Directive 52.
8. See HOSPITAL MERGERS, supra note 7. See also DIRECTIVES, supra note 6, at Directive 45.
9. See HOSPITAL MERGERS, supra note 7. See also DIRECTIVES, supra note 6, at Directive 53.
Sterilization is the most common form of contraception today. See HOSPITAL MERGERS, supra note 7,
at 6.
10. See HOSPITAL MERGERS, supra note 7. See also DIRECTIVES, supra note 6, at Directive 45.
Additionally, Directive 36 permits emergency contraception for rape victims but only if they test
negative for pregnancy. As pregnancy tests must be performed at least seven days after conception to be
effective, and emergency contraception is effective only in the first seventy-two hours after conception,
it is unclear whether Catholic hospitals ever provide emergency contraception in practice. Id. at
Directive 36. See HOSPITAL MERGERS, supra note 7, at 6 n.8.
11. See HOSPITAL MERGERS, supra note 7, at 6.
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health care facility for miles around. Additionally, there are numerous
Catholic-sponsored outpatient clinics and managed care plans that must also
follow these directives, which in turn impacts many more women.12
While the impact of the religious restrictions on health care in Catholic
hospitals is already enormous, it continues to grow. As hospitals throughout
the country face growing financial difficulties, religiously affiliated institutions
have increasingly turned to mergers with non-sectarian institutions as a remedy.
In the past ten years, "almost 170 non-Catholic hospitals have merged or
otherwise affiliated with Catholic health care entities."' 3  When Catholic
hospitals merge with non-sectarian institutions, they often insist on adherence
to the Ethical and Religious Directives as a condition of the merger. As a 1998
survey indicated, "reproductive health services were discontinued in 48 percent
of the completed mergers and affiliations involving Catholic entities" that
year.
14
As a further solution to the financial difficulties experienced by many
health care institutions, Catholic hospitals have begun to merge with one
another, creating "Catholic health care 'mega-systems."' Upon merger, these
"mega-systems" gain inordinate bargaining power, leaving smaller, non-
sectarian institutions vulnerable to exclusion from the market altogether.' 5
Through these mergers with both secular and Catholic institutions, an
increasing number of non-sectarian private hospitals are swallowed by the
religious health care system while others are pushed out of the market entirely,
creating a situation in which access to abortions and other legal and often
essential health care services is severely restricted for thousands of women.
But patients' rights are not the only ones at stake in this emerging culture.
The rights of thousands of hospital employees are affected by Catholic doctrine
as well. The Catholic Health Association itself reported that as of 2001,
Catholic hospitals employed 731,000 full and part-time workers.16
Additionally, Baptist, Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, and Seventh
Day Adventist hospitals often adhere to similar restrictions, affecting both their
patients and their employees. 17  Hospitals that follow religious doctrine in
treating their patients often also insist on adherence to the doctrine by all those
who are employed there regardless of the employees' personal beliefs or
convictions. This article will explore the problem faced by the doctors
12. See id.
13. Id. at 7.
14. Id. at 6 n.22. Note that the data in this survey refers only to those mergers and affiliations for
which the surveyors were able to obtain information.
15. See id. at 7.
16. See MERGERWATCH, No STRINGS ATTACHED: PUBLIC FUNDING OF RELIGIOUSLY SPONSORED
HOSPITALS IN THE UNITED STATES 24 (2002) [hereinafter No STRINGS ATTACHED].
17. Id. For example, some Baptist hospitals prohibit the performance of "elective" abortions in their
facilities. In addition, one HMO that is affiliated with the Church of Latter Day Saints refuses to cover
sterilizations until a woman has had five children or has reached the age of forty. See id. at 24-25.
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described above as well as numerous other health care professionals as their
freedoms of speech, belief, and association are curtailed by the fear of job loss,
demotion, or other adverse employment actions. As religious hospitals begin to
dominate the health care market, an increasingly dire situation is created for
those who work in the field.
This article examines a potential litigation strategy that may be used to
combat the power of religious health care facilities to force their employees to
conform to religious directives. Part I suggests that the Church Amendment, a
18piece of legislation attached to the Health Programs Extension Act of 1973 ,
may be used to prohibit sectarian hospitals from restricting the pro-choice
beliefs, words, and outside actions of the health care professionals they employ.
This piece of appropriations legislation contains a constitutionally valid
conditional spending provision which mandates that hospitals accepting certain
federal funds refrain from discriminating in employment, promotion and
demotion, and extension of staff privileges on the basis of an employee's
religious or moral convictions respecting abortion. This legislation may be
used to protect doctors' 9 who have performed or wish to perform abortions at
facilities other than the religious one in which they primarily work; it can
protect doctors who wish to maintain their staff privileges at a Catholic hospital
but speak out publicly in support of reproductive rights; and it will provide
protection for doctors who wish to refrain from signing agreements to abide by
the National Conference of Bishops' Ethical and Religious Directives for
Catholic Health Care Services unless the agreement is specific to actions
within that hospital only. Part II examines the legislative history surrounding
the Church Amendment, arguing that courts should imply a private right of
action into this legislation that will allow doctors to sue when their rights under
this amendment have been violated. Finally, Part III argues that the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA),2' which some have suggested is an
obstacle to the use of the Church Amendment in this context, does not, in fact,
impact this litigation strategy at all.
As religious health care systems grow ever larger and more powerful,
access to reproductive services is curtailed and employee rights are restricted.
Pro-choice health care professionals continue to be forced to limit the
expression of their beliefs both in and outside the workplace. The courts must
be utilized to address these troubling developments. The use of the Church
18. Health Programs Extension Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (Deering, LEXIS through November
2003).
19. The use of the term "doctors" in this paper is intended to include all health care professionals.
20. See DIRECTIVES, supra note 6.
21. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (Deering, LEXIS through November
2003).
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Amendment as part of a litigation strategy is one way that doctors can maintain
their freedoms in this changing health care culture.
22
I. RESORTING To EXTRA-LEGAL MEASURES
As religious health care systems continue to grow in both power and
influence, it is vital that physicians use the Church Amendment and other
developing legal remedies to deal with restrictions on their rights. The dangers
of being complicit in the restrictive approaches of Catholic and other religious
health care systems or of operating through extra-legal or even illegal measures
are too great both for doctors and their patients.
Physicians for Reproductive Choice and Health (PRCH) has reported that
numerous doctors have chosen to ignore the restrictions or to illicitly subvert
the hospital policies. Many sectarian hospitals, while requiring their physicians
to sign agreements to abide by the Ethical and Religious Directives,
simultaneously suggest that they will not interfere in the doctors' work or
communication with their patients. PRCH cautions doctors that such "don't
ask, don't tell" policies should not be trusted. A doctor who signs such an
agreement has entered into a legally binding contract and can face serious
consequences should she breach it.23  In this way, when doctors ignore the
restrictions created by religious hospitals they endanger their jobs and
reputations.
Furthermore, some doctors suggest that they will continue to practice
medicine in accordance with their beliefs regardless of the religious hospital's
policy and its dedication to the policy's enforcement. Dr. Erik Cohen, M.D. of
22. As courts tend to follow public opinion on controversial matters, it is important to note that the
American public is overwhelmingly in favor of curtailing the powers of sectarian institutions with
respect to their employees' rights and beliefs. A recent public opinion poll conducted by the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) found that eighty-six percent of Americans oppose "allowing employers
to refuse to provide their employees with health insurance coverage for medical services the employer
objects to on religious grounds." Protecting the Rights of Conscience of Health Care Providers and a
Parent 's Right to Know: Hearing on H.R. 4691 Before the Subcomm. on Health of the House Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 19 (2002) (prepared statement of Catherine Weiss, Director, ACLU
Reproductive Freedom Project) [hereinafter Weiss Testimony]. Additionally, seventy-nine percent of
those polled believe that it is "more important to respect the personal conscience of individuals making
difficult decisions" than to "respect the conscience of a religious hospital." Id. Finally, seventy-two
percent of Americans are more concerned that the government hold "all hospitals - whether religiously
affiliated or not - to the same standards" than they are about keeping "the government from forcing
religious hospitals to violate their beliefs." Id. Thus, it is clear that while religious hospitals continue to
impose their beliefs on their patients and employees alike, the American public, which often informs the
direction of the courts, agrees that individual rights and constitutional freedoms should be protected over
those of a religiously affiliated institution. It is in this context that the Church Amendment should be
used in court to protect the rights of pro-choice health care professionals. Additionally, it is important to
mention that the ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project, referenced above, is one of several parties
interested in bringing a test case under the Church Amendment.
23. PHYSICIANS FOR REPRODUCTIVE CHOICE AND HEALTH & MERGERWATCH, MERGERS AND
You: THE PHYSICIANS' GUIDE TO RELIGIOUS HOSPITAL MERGERS 5 (2001) [hereinafter MERGERS
AND YOU].
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Gilroy, California, was quoted as saying "[u]ntil they put a nun next to me, I
will give a patient all of her medical options and allow her to make her own
decision., 24 Unfortunately, some doctors see undercover medicine as the only
answer. One report indicated that a staffer at a religious hospital told a caller
that she could dispense morning after pills only if the woman met her in the
parking lot.25 Other doctors indicate that they "feel compelled to perform one
procedure but write it up as another.",26 Such practices can be disastrous for a
patient if no one monitors her use of prescription medication or if her future
doctor cannot look at her records and find her actual medical history before
prescribing medication or performing an operation.
PRCH suggests numerous options for doctors who do not want to be forced
into endangering the lives of their patients or their careers: organizing and
speaking out against hospital mergers and religiously affiliated hospitals that
restrict the rights of patients and doctors in the area of reproductive health;
encouraging doctors to redirect patients to hospitals that provide full
reproductive services (thereby pressuring religiously affiliated hospitals
through economic means); and speaking out against legislation that allows for
broad institutional "religious exemptions. 27 This article suggests that with the
use of the Church Amendment, doctors have an additional option-litigation.
Hospital mergers and the enforcement of religious doctrine in the health care
context impact both patients and their doctors. The Church Amendment
provides a means by which doctors can use the judicial process to enter this
debate.
II. USING LITIGATION TO PROTECT EMPLOYEE RIGHTS IN RELIGIOUSLY
AFFILIATED HOSPITALS
A. Litigation Strategies Involving Title VII
While this article is primarily concerned with an examination of the
Church Amendment and its litigation potential, it is important to note that there
are other potentially successful litigation strategies being used to address the
curtailment of employee freedoms in religiously affiliated workplaces. One
such strategy is currently in development in both Georgia and Kentucky where




27. See MERGERS AND YOU, supra note 23, at 14 -18.
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lawsuits have been filed arguing that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
28may be used in such cases.
Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or
to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. Although that section broadly prohibits religious discrimination,
Congress also included a provision in Section 702 of the Act to provide an
exemption for religious organizations. 30 Section 702 provides that Title VII's
non-discrimination mandate "shall not apply to... a religious corporation,
association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment
of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the
carrying on by such corporation, educational institution, or society of its
activities., 31  This provision, known as the "ministerial exception," exempts
religious institutions from adhering to Title VII's non-discrimination mandate
with regard to religious discrimination. In 1987, the United States Supreme
Court in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter Day Saints v. Amos held that application of the Section 702 exception to
a religious organization's secular activities was not a violation of the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.32 Thus, a religious organization
was permitted to discriminate based on religion in its employment of
individuals who fill both religious and secular positions.33
Taken together, Section 702 and Amos seem to suggest that a sectarian
hospital may discriminate based on religious beliefs in the hiring, firing,
promotion, and extension of staff privileges. Thus, it would seem that a pro-
choice physician seeking a remedy in Title VII for his discharge from a
Catholic hospital should look elsewhere. The hospital can claim that under
Section 702, it was permitted to discriminate based on religious beliefs and that
beliefs and actions regarding abortion qualified as such. Furthermore, under
Amos, the hospital can convincingly argue that despite the fact that a physician
28. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (Deering, LEXIS through
November 2003).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (Deering, LEXIS through November 2003).
30. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, § 702, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-I (Deering, LEXIS through
November 2003).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a) (Deering, LEXIS through November 2003).
32. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. Amos,
483 U.S. 337, 339 (1987).
33. The Court concluded based on the three-part test established in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602 (1971), that application of the ministerial exception to secular activities served a secular legislative
purpose of alleviating government interference with the ability of religious organizations to define and
carry out their religious missions, that application of § 702 in this context did not constitute government
advancement of religion, and that § 702 in fact avoids excessive entanglement of church and state by
removing judicial inquiry into religious belief. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 339.
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occupies a secular position at the institution, the very fact that it is a sectarian
hospital allows it to discriminate in this way.
However, courts in both Georgia and Kentucky have recently been asked to
reconsider the ministerial exception in light of developments in government
funding of religious organizations. 34 In both cases, religious institutions that
receive a large portion of their annual budget from government funding fired or
denied employment to the plaintiffs. These plaintiffs claim that the religious
institution violated Title VII in denying them employment based solely on their
religious beliefs. They further claim that the religious institution is not entitled
to invoke the religious exemption under Section 702 of Title VII because such
an application would violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
By accepting government funding, they argue, the religious institution has
waived its right to invoke the ministerial exception, as to do so would directly
implicate the government in both religious discrimination and in the
advancement of a particular religion, a clear violation of the First
Amendment.35
A 1989 district court case from Mississippi, Dodge v. Salvation Army,
36 de horiginally proposed the argument used in both of these cases. In Dodge, the
plaintiff, a Victim's Assistance Coordinator at a Domestic Violence Shelter
operated by the Salvation Army was terminated because she was discovered to
be a practicing Wiccan. The court held-that because the plaintiff's position was
funded entirely through government funding, the Salvation Army could not rely
on Section 702 in justifying the termination, as that would have the
unconstitutional effect of government endorsement of religion through the
religious institution's employment practices.37
While the success of this argument in the current Georgia and Kentucky
cases would be a hopeful development in the areas of religious freedom and
employee rights, there are a number of reasons to doubt that the plaintiffs will
prevail. First, Dodge is an unpublished opinion from a district court. No
higher courts have dealt with this issue, making Dodge a rather unpersuasive
precedent. Furthermore, in 1994, five years after Dodge, a district court in
Georgia decided contrary to Dodge. In Siegel v. Truett-McConnell College,
Inc., a private sectarian college fired one of its professors because he was not a
34. See Bellmore v. United Methodist Children's Home of the N. Ga Conf., Inc., No. 56-474
(Super. Ct. Fulton Cty. Ga. filed Jul. 31, 2002.) See also Pedreira v. Kentucky Baptist Home for
Children, 186 F. Supp. 2d 757 (W.D. Ky. 2001). The court in the Kentucky case found that the
defendant's prohibition on employment of homosexuals did not constitute religious discrimination under
Title VII. See Pedreira, 186 F. Supp. 2d. at 762. The court in Georgia has yet to decide this issue.
35. See Plaintiff's Complaint at 17-18, Bellmore (No. 56-474 ) ("United Methodist Children's
Home (UMCH) cannot, consistent with the United States and Georgia Constitutions, engage in religious
discrimination under shelter of this exemption while receiving substantial government financial
support.").
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Christian. 38 Arguing that the college could not invoke Section 702 because of
its receipt of government funds, the plaintiff claimed relief under Title VII.
The Georgia court, however, distinguished Dodge, finding that in Dodge, the
government funds had "substantially if not exclusively" funded the position at
issue whereas in Siegel there was no direct federal or state subsidy of the
church sponsored school.39 Instead, the government provided grants to students
who then chose to attend a religiously affiliated school. In this context, the
court found that the religious institution could invoke Section 702 to protect its
employment decision without it constituting a violation of the Establishment
Clause.
The argument with respect to a religious hospital falls somewhere between
these two cases. Almost all hospitals receive some form of government
funding, especially with the proliferation of Medicare and Medicaid grants. As
such, the funding does go directly to the hospital and not through its patients
alone. On the other hand, it is difficult to claim that the position of a particular
physician is financed substantially through a government grant or funding
stream. While the argument that succeeded in Dodge might be made in the
religious hospital context, it is far from a safe bet. As a result, health care
professionals must wait for the resolution of the issue before the Georgia and
Kentucky courts before concluding whether it constitutes a viable litigation
strategy for pro-choice health care professionals. In the interim, the Church
Amendment provides an alternative that can more confidently be relied upon to
challenge religious discrimination by sectarian hospitals, particularly
discrimination relating to abortion views.
B. The Church Amendment as Conscience Clause: The Background and
Statutory Text of the Amendment
The Church Amendment, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7, was an
amendment to the Health Programs Extension Act of 1973 and was signed into
law by President Nixon on June 18, 1973.40 This Act was an extension of
components of the Public Health Services Act,4' an omnibus bill that contained
numerous grants and programs for health care facilities and providers.42 The
38. Siegel v. Truett-McConnell Coll., Inc., 13 F. Supp. 2d 1335 (N.D.G.A. 1994), aff'd, 73 F.3d
1108 (11 th Cir. 1995).
39. Id. at 1344.
40. The Church Amendment was Title IV, Section 401 of the Health Programs Extension Act of
1973. See also Watkins v. Mercy Medical Center, 364 F. Supp. 799, 801 (D. Idaho 1973), aff'd, 520
F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1975).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 201 (Deering, LEXIS through November 2003).
42. One of the major pieces of funding legislation included in the Public Health Services Act is the
Hill-Burton Act, Pub. L. No. 79-725, 60 Stat. 1040 (1946), which provides funding for the construction
of hospitals and other health care facilities. The Hill-Burton program was established in the post-World
War II period to respond to the shortage of hospital facilities in many areas around the country. One
scholar estimates that in the first twenty years of the program, over half of the hospitals in the country
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Church Amendment, given its name because of its sponsor, Senator Frank
Church of Idaho, was tacked on to this piece of appropriations legislation in
order to clarify the obligations of health care facilities with regard to abortion
and to create conditions upon which receipt of government funding depended.
The Amendment provided, in part:
(b) The receipt of any grant, contract, loan or loan guarantee under the
Public Health Service Act, the Community Mental Health Centers Act,
or the Developmental Disabilities Services and Facilities Construction
Act by any individual or entity does not authorize any court or any
public official or other public authority to require -
(1) such individual to perform or assist in the performance of any
sterilization procedure or abortion if his performance or assistance
in the performance of such procedure or abortion would be
contrary to his religious beliefs or moral convictions; or
(2) such entity to -
(A) make its facilities available for the performance of any
sterilization procedure or abortion if the performance of such
procedure or abortion in such facilities is prohibited by the
entity on the basis of religious beliefs or moral convictions, or
(B) provide any personnel for the performance or assistance in
the performance of any sterilization procedure or abortion if
the performance or assistance in the performance of such
procedure or abortion by such personnel would be contrary to
the religious beliefs or moral convictions of such personnel.43
This first piece of the amendment has been called a "conscience clause,"
because it seeks to protect the conscience of religious hospitals by preventing
courts from forcing such institutions to provide abortions or sterilizations.
Senator Church proposed his amendment to the Health Programs Extension
Act of 1973 in the context of the concern and controversy that arose after the
Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Roe held that
statutes that prohibited all abortions violated a woman's constitutional right to
privacy.44 As is well known, Roe provoked a great deal of controversy, leading
Congress to immediately begin considering a number of laws limiting abortion.
These laws came in the form of constitutional amendments as well as statutory
proposals.45  A number of Congressmen proposed amendments to the
Constitution which would mandate the application of the due process and equal
received Hill-Burton funding. See KENNETH WING, THE LAW AND THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH 124 (2d ed.
1985).
43. 42 U.S.C. §300a-7 (West Supp. 1991).
44. Roe, 410U.S. 113.
45. Harriet F. Pilpel & Dorothy E. Patton, Abortion, Conscience and the Constitution An
Examination of Federal Institutional Conscience Clauses, 6 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 279, 280-283
(1975).
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protection clauses to unborn fetuses, except in cases where the mother's life
was in danger, while others sought to pass constitutional amendments that
prohibited abortion altogether.46 The statutory proposals often sought to
restrict the use of federal funds for abortion or abortion-related services.4 7
While Congress rejected or allowed to lapse many of these proposals, it did
enact a number of abortion-limiting laws as amendments to existing federal
laws. In addition to the Church Amendment, passed in 1973, Congress also
enacted the Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, which prohibited the use
of program funds in litigation seeking to compel the performance of an abortion
against the conscience of the provider.48 It also enacted the Foreign Aid
Assistance Act of 1973, which prohibited the use of AID funds to "pay for the
performance of abortions as a method of family planning or to motivate or
coerce any person to practice abortion., 49  The Church Amendment's
conscience clause therefore was not unique in its intent to limit the implications
of Roe.
While the Church Amendment was, at the time, in keeping with many
similar proposals, Senator Church proposed it in response to a specific decision
by a federal district court in Montana.5° The court in Taylor v. St. Vincent's
Hospital issued a temporary injunction on October 27, 1972, requiring the
hospital to perform a tubal ligation on the plaintiff despite the hospital's protest
that such a procedure was contrary to its religious conviction. 51  The court
based its decision on the hospital's receipt of Hill-Burton Funds, reasoning that
such funds led to the hospital being a state actor.52 Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a
state actor is prohibited from denying plaintiff her constitutional right to a
sterilization procedure.53 In order to insure that Taylor could not be replicated
46. Id at 283. Senator Buckley of New York proposed an amendment that sought to provide due
process and equal protection to the unborn offspring. Representative Hogan of Maryland proposed an
outright ban on abortions as a constitutional amendment. See id. at 283 n.27.
47. Id. at 283.
48. Pub. L. No. 93-355, § 1007 (b) (8), 88 Stat. 378 (1974).
(b) No funds made available by the Corporation under this title, either by grant or contract
may be used... (8) to provide legal assistance with respect to any proceeding or litigation
which seeks to procure a non-therapeutic abortion or to compel any individual or institution
to perform an abortion, or assist in the performance of an abortion, or provide the facilities
for the performance of an abortion, contrary to the religious beliefs or moral convictions of
such individual or institution.
Id.
49. Pub. L. No. 93-189, § 2, 87 Stat. 714 (1973); see also Pilpel & Patton, supra note 45, at 287.
50. See 119 CONG. REC. 9595 (Senator Church explaining his rationale for proposing this
amendment).
51. 369 F. Supp. 948 (D. Mont. 1973).
52. Id. See also supra note 42.
53. The statute provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
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elsewhere in the country, Senator Church proposed his amendment to the
Health Programs Extension Act of 1973, which clarified congressional intent
that the receipt of federal funding not be used to force a religious hospital to
violate its convictions and perform an abortion or sterilization procedure in its
facility.
The Taylor case was ultimately decided after the enactment of the Church
Amendment. Therefore, the court dissolved its prior injunction and denied
plaintiffs all relief, finding that "[b]y its plain language, [the Church
Amendment] prohibits any court from finding that a hospital which receives
Hill-Burton funds is acting under color of state law."54  The Ninth Circuit
affirmed, holding that "the Church Amendment properly permits
denominational hospitals to refuse to perform sterilizations," that the
amendment was a permissible legislative action, and that it did not violate the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 55 Thus, the courts interpreted
the Church Amendment's conscience clause as its sponsor had intended and
denied the plaintiff the right to demand a sterilization procedure at a private
religious hospital5 6
C. The Church Amendment's Non-Discrimination Provision: The Background
and Statutory Text of this Provision
The Church Amendment, however, did more than merely prevent courts
from forcing religious hospitals to perform abortions or sterilization
procedures. As a result of an amendment by Senator Javits of New York to the
original proposal, the Church Amendment was passed with a non-
discrimination provision in addition to the conscience clause.5 7 The second
half of the Church Amendment reads, in part:
(c) No entity which receives a grant, contract, loan, or loan guarantee
under the Public Health Service Act, the Community Mental Health
42 U.S.C. §1983 (Deering, LEXIS through November 2003). See also 119 CONG. REC. 9595 (Sen.
Church explaining his rationale for proposing this amendment).
54. Taylor, 369 F. Supp. at 950.
55. Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 523 F.2d 75, 77 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 948
(1976). The Supreme Court denied cert in this case over the objections of Justice White and the Chief
Justice who dissented, arguing that there was a clear conflict between the circuits on this issue. See
Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 424 U.S. 948, 949 (1976). While the Seventh, Tenth, and Sixth Circuits
all agreed with the Taylor decision, see Doe v. Bellin Memorial Hosp., 479 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1976),
Ward v. St. Anthony Hosp., 476 F.2d 671 (10th Cir. 1973), Jackson v. Norton-Children's Hosp., Inc.,
487 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1973), the Fourth Circuit in Doe v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 529 F.2d 638 (4th
Cir. 1975), had decided to the contrary. See Taylor, 424 U.S. at 949.
56. It later became clear that this provision of the Church Amendment was unnecessary as the
notion that state action could be found on the basis of receipt of federal funds was overruled in a number
of later decisions. See Catherine Weiss (Director, ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project), Address at
the "Public Dollars, Religious Doctrine" MergerWatch Conference (Nov. 19, 2002).
57. See 119 CONG. REc. 9599.
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Centers Act, or the Developmental Disabilities Services and Facilities
Construction Act after June 18, 1973 may -
(A) discriminate in the employment, promotion, or termination of
employment of any physician or other health care personnel, or
(B) discriminate in the extension of staff or other privileges to any
physician or other health care personnel,
because he performed or assisted in the performance of a lawful
sterilization procedure or abortion, because he refused to perform or
assist in the performance of such a procedure or abortion on the
grounds that his performance or assistance in the performance of the
procedure or abortion would be contrary to his religious beliefs or
moral convictions, or because of his religious beliefs or moral
convictions respecting any such service or activity. 5
This component of the Church Amendment has an entirely different function
from the first half of the amendment. Whereas the first half clarifies the
jurisdiction of the courts respecting private religious hospitals and their receipt
of federal funds, this second component acts as a condition on the grant of such
funding under the above-mentioned acts.
Such conditional funding legislation is, and was at the time of its passage, a
common method of achieving congressional aims. Congress has the power to
tax and spend for the general welfare and can therefore place conditions on its
grant of federal money.59 Conditional spending is particularly prevalent in
health care regulation as Congress often uses such provisions as a means of
impacting the distribution of health care resources. Such regulation began in
the post-World War II period as the government began to require that hospitals
be licensed in order to receive Hill-Burton funds.60 In 1974, Congress passed
the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act, which asserted
federal control over the local planning and development of health care
facilities. Congress exerted this control through conditional spending.
Participation in the program was voluntary, but those institutions that failed to
comply with the requirements risked losing funding under this federal
61
program.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (West Supp. 1991). The Church Amendment was expanded in 1974 by the
National Research Service Award Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-348, § 214, 88 Stat. 342 (1974), which
provides that entities receiving a grant or contract for biomedical or behavioral research under any
program administered by the Secretary of Health and Human Services may not discriminate against a
physician or other health care personnel because he performed, assisted in the performance of, or
refused to perform any lawful health service or research activity as a result of his religious beliefs or
moral convictions. This amendment significantly expanded the reach of the Church Amendment's non-
discrimination provision.
59. See WING, supra note 42, at 135.
60. Id. at 120. See also supra note 42 for a discussion of Hill-Burton Funds.
61. Id. at 127.
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The constitutionality of these and other similar conditions is well
established. A number of courts have found such conditional funding to be
within Congress's valid constitutional authority under Article I, Section 8,
which grants Congress the power to "lay and collect taxes... and provide for
the general welfare., 62 The courts have found that conditional spending could
be limited only if the condition served no legitimate national purpose or if the
condition was not voluntary but rather was legally coercive.63 Courts have
typically given broad interpretation to the "general welfare" provision or the
requirement of a legitimate national purpose, treating the health care of the
public as a legitimate purpose.64 As a result of the significance attributed to
health care and its costs, "the courts have rarely invalidated a spending
condition imposed by the federal government on either a private or a public
recipient. ' 65  Court decisions have focused on the dual notions that "(a)
recipients always remain free to forego federal funds and thus avoid unwanted
conditions and (b) Congress should have broad authority to control the way in
which federally funded activities are administered.,
66
Courts also have determined that a spending condition is only coercive if
Congress imposes an additional sanction other than the withdrawal of federal
67funds to require compliance. While the federal funding in question may be so
great a sum as to make the recipient's choice practically nonexistent, courts
have rarely considered this to be a violation, looking instead for literal
68voluntariness. Finally, some legal commentators have suggested that courts
should scrutinize the relationship of the condition to the spending program to
which it is attached and demand a clear nexus between the two. Such an
argument suggests that "any condition must relate to the particular general
62. See North Carolina ex rel. Morrow v. Califano, 445 F. Supp. 532 (E.D.N.C. 1977) aff'd mem.,
435 U.S. 962 (1978) (holding that the requirements in the National Health Planning and Resource
Development Act of 1974 for qualifying for financial grants were constitutionally valid as the conditions
on funding related to the legitimate national interest in health and should not be viewed as "coercive" in
the constitutional sense). See also Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1922) (holding, in part, that
the provisions that accompany funding under the Maternity Act impose "no obligation but simply extend
an option which the state is free to accept or reject" making them constitutionally valid).
63. See Califano, 445 F. Supp. at 535-36. See also WING, supra note 42, at 135.
64. Kenneth R. Wing & Andrew M. Silton, Constitutional Authority for Extending Federal Control
Over the Delivery of Healthcare, 57 N.C. L. REv. 1423, 1439 (1978-79).
65. Id. at 1440-41.
66. Id.
67. See WING, supra note 42, at 135.
68. See Wing & Silton, supra note 64, at 1441-44. For example, in Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 447, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the conditional funding provisions in the federal
maternal and child health program, noting that "[t]he powers of the State are not invaded, since the
statute imposes no obligation but simply extends an option which the State is free to accept or reject."
Id. at 480 (as cited in Wing & Silton, supra note 64, at 1441 n. 77). In 1974, the Seventh Circuit further
bolstered this point in Rasulis v. Weinberger, 502 F.2d 1006 (7th Cir. 1974) when it upheld the
constitutionality of conditions regarding professional standards for physical therapists that Congress had
attached to the Medicare and Medicaid programs. The court noted that, "[t]he economic incentives of
participation in the Medicare Program does not constitute coercion or control." Rasulis, 502 F.2d at
1010.
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welfare objective of the funding program to which it is attached., 69 Despite
this, the courts have typically given Congress broad discretion in this area,
challenging the condition imposed only when it "strains the logic of the
traditional constitutional justifications for the conditional spending authority.
... Indeed, indications are that such conditions will be upheld with a
minimum of judicial scrutiny of the condition or the relationship of the
condition to the program's objectives. 7 °
The jurisprudence described above, concerning the issue of conditional
spending, suggests that courts would view the Church Amendment's non-
discrimination provision favorably. The Church Amendment is a literally
voluntary condition on federal funding.7' It pertains to issues of health care and
to a legitimate national purpose of protecting the religious freedom and free
speech rights of employees. Finally, the non-discrimination condition is
directly related to the funding program to which it is attached because the
government's willingness to be involved with the furtherance of private health
care in this country is dependant upon this condition.
72
The Church Amendment has itself faced and survived constitutional
challenge, however, only with respect to the conscience clause provision of the
amendment. In Chrisman v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, a twenty-three year
old woman who had been denied a sterilization procedure at a private sectarian
hospital in Oregon filed an action against the hospital.73 The plaintiff claimed
that the hospital was a state actor by virtue of its receipt of Hill-Burton
construction funds and that the hospital had refused to sterilize her because of
religious beliefs, a motivation that constituted a violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983
which prevents the deprivation of any Constitutional right "under color of state
law.",74  The court, in addressing this argument, concluded that the Church
Amendment prohibited courts from using the receipt of Hill-Burton funds as
the basis for compelling the provision of abortions or sterilization procedures.
While the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of the Church Amendment,
69. See Wing & Silton, supra note 64, at 1445. While the Supreme Court has never explicitly
adopted this argument, Justice Stone advocated this position in his dissent in United States v. Butler. See
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1,85-86 (1935) (Stone, J., dissenting).
70. Wing & Silton, supra note 64 at 1441, 1446.
71. It should be noted that while complicated issues of state sovereignty are involved when
examining the coercive effect of federal funding conditions applied to states, such issues do not apply to
the Church Amendment which contains funding conditions for private health care institutions. See
Wing & Silton, supra note 64 at 1442-43, 1451-60.
72. The only case that has ever mentioned the application of the Church Amendment in the context
in which I am suggesting its use is Watkins v. Mercy Med. Ctr. et al., 520 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1975). The
lower court in Watkins apparently required the hospital defendant to reinstate the doctor because his
rights under the non-discrimination provision of the Church Amendment had been violated. However,
this reinstatement decision was not explicitly mentioned in the district court opinion nor was it
challenged on appeal. As such, it is only mentioned in passing in the Ninth Circuit opinion and its
constitutionality is never discussed. The case will be discussed in full later in this article. See
discussion infra p. 153.
73. Chrisman v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 506 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1974).
74. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Deering, LEXIS through November 2003).
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claiming it was a violation of the Establishment Clause, the court found the
Church Amendment's protection of sectarian hospitals to be constitutional in
that it was a valid act of congressional power and did not "affirmatively prefer
one religion over another., 75 In discussing the validity of congressional
authority in this area, the court noted, "[i]t has long been held that Congress has
the power to modify and alter the jurisdiction which it has conferred on inferior
,,76courts of the United States. The court rejected the plaintiffs Establishment
Clause challenge, finding that the Church Amendment, in fact, preserved the
government's neutrality in the face of religion by protecting the religious
freedom of those with religious objections to abortions and sterilizations.77
While the only constitutional challenge thus far has pertained solely to the
conscience clause section of the Church Amendment, should there be an
Establishment Clause challenge to the non-discrimination provision, courts
would likely follow the Chrisman rationale. In determining the
constitutionality of the non-discrimination provision, courts will likely agree
that by simply protecting the religious freedom of hospital employees without
intruding into the hospital's religious freedom, the second section of the Church
Amendment also "preserves the government's neutrality in the face of religious
differences" and hence does not violate the Establishment Clause.78
D. Using the Church Amendment to Protect Health Care Professionals
As has been described above, the Church Amendment functions to protect
sectarian hospitals whose sponsors oppose abortion and sterilization procedures
as well as the employees of such hospitals who do not share their employers'
religious or moral convictions. While this amendment suggests that a hospital
cannot be forced by a patient, a doctor, or even a court to perform an abortion
in its facility, it likewise cannot discriminate against a health care professional
who professes support for reproductive rights or actually performs abortions or
sterilization procedures in other facilities. As such, the problems encountered
by the three doctors described at the beginning of this paper can all be
addressed by the Church Amendment's non-discrimination provision. These
three doctors represent examples of each of the three categories of problems
-addressed by the Church Amendment.
Dr. Yogendra Shah was asked to step down from his position as chair of
Obstetrics-Gynecology at a Catholic hospital because he performed abortions at
75. See Chrisman, 506 F.2d at 311.
76. Id. at 311 (citing Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. 236 (1844)).
77. Id. The Chrisman court here cited Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), analogizing the
Church Amendment to the Sherbert holding that South Carolina could not, as a condition of receiving
unemployment benefits, force a Seventh-Day Adventist to work on her Sabbath. In so doing, the court
there, like the Church Amendment here, maintained government neutrality on religious questions. Id.
78. See Chrisman, 506 F.2d at 311.
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a private clinic across the street. In effect, he was demoted as a result of his
actions as an abortion provider.79 This case received a great deal of attention in
the media and particularly within the anti-abortion Internet community. St.
Elizabeth's Hospital had known for a long time that Dr. Shah performed
abortions at a private clinic. His employment and high-level position in
Obstetrics-Gynecology became a problem only when the anti-abortion lobby
rallied around the issue, putting enormous pressure on the hospital. It was at
that point that the hospital asked Dr. Shah to step down from his position.80
Had the hospital carefully considered its rights and obligations under the
Church Amendment, perhaps it would not have caved under the pressure of the
anti-abortion lobby. Furthermore, had Dr. Shah wanted to, he could have
enforced his rights in court by relying on the Church Amendment's provisions.
The Church Amendment specifically states that an entity receiving funds under
the Public Health Service Acte' may not "discriminate in the employment,
promotion, or termination of employment of any physician. . . because he
performed or assisted in the performance of a lawful sterilization procedure or
abortion ... .82
Dr. David Mesches could also have relied on the Church Amendment to
enforce his rights. Dr. Mesches was dismissed from his position at the Roman
Catholic New York Medical College because of statements he made in the
newspaper that were perceived to be supportive of reproductive rights. Soon
after these statements were published, Dr. Ralph O'Connell, dean of the
College's School of Medicine, told Dr. Mesches that "it would not be possible
for him to hold this public position on abortion and to continue to be the chair
of our department., 8 3 The School's Vice President of Communications, when
speaking to a local newspaper, added, "He took a position that does not support
the values and mission of New York Medical College. 8 4 Like Dr. Shah, had
Dr. Mesches chosen to pursue this case in a court of law, he could have relied
on the Church Amendment to enforce his rights. The Amendment is clear with
regard to discrimination based on a physician's views on abortion, stating that
79. See Heather Ratcliffe, Doctor Who Does Abortions at Clinic Is Demoted by Catholic Hospital
but He Will Stay on Staff at St. Elizabeth in Granite City, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Dec. 21, 2000, at
B2.
80. See e-mail from Sally Burgess, Hope Clinic for Women, to author (Nov. 30, 2002) (on file with
author).
81. The Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 201-207, 209-229, 241-272, 281-286, (Deering,
LEXIS through November 2003), is a large piece of funding legislation under which most hospitals
receive some funding. For example, The Hill-Burton program, which has provided funding to thousands
of hospitals, is included in the Public Health Service Act along with numerous other funding programs.
However, it is important to note that Medicare and Medicaid funding are covered under the Social
Security Act and hence receipt of those funds do not make a hospital liable under the Church
Amendment.
82. The Church Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c)(1) (West. Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
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entities receiving funding as described above may not discriminate against a
physician or other health care professional "because of his religious beliefs or
moral convictions respecting sterilization procedures or abortions.
'' 5
Finally, Dr. Schales Atkinson could'also have relied on the Church
Amendment had he wished to maintain his staff privileges at the Methodist-
affiliated Deaconess Hospital while refusing to sign an agreement that he
would not perform abortions even outside of the sectarian hospital's facility.
Because the Church Amendment prohibits discrimination based on a
physician's having performed an abortion, the most successful strategy for Dr.
Atkinson would have been to make clear that he was signing the agreement
under duress and then perform an abortion or sterilization procedure outside the
hospital. If the hospital had then taken any adverse employment action against
him, Dr. Atkinson could have relied on the Church Amendment in demanding
that his privileges be restored.
86
Since the enactment of the Church Amendment, there has only been one
case which seemed, in part, to rely on the amendment's non-discrimination
provision as part of a litigation strategy. That case emerged in the period
directly after the enactment of the amendment and before the issue of hospital
mergers and the growth of sectarian hospitals in the health care field made the
Church Amendment even more vital. The case, Watkins v. Mercy Medical
Center, was an action by a doctor who sought injunctive relief against a
hospital that had refused to renew his staff privileges when he refused to sign
an agreement to abide by the Catholic Hospital's Ethical and Religious
Directives. 87  The Directives of the Mercy Medical Center specifically
prohibited staff physicians from performing voluntary or involuntary
vasectomies or other sterilization or abortion operations in a hospital setting.
88
Dr. Watkins had sued the hospital, claiming that the refusal to extend his staff
privileges constituted a deprivation of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. The court, however, denied the plaintiff relief, citing the Church
Amendment and its language explicitly prohibiting "any court from finding
state action on the part of a hospital which receives Hill-Burton funds and using
that finding as a basis for requiring the hospital to make its facilities available
85. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c)(1) (West. Supp. 1991).
86. See discussion infra Part I1, which will discuss in more detail the remedies available under the
Church Amendment. In brief, a physician may sue the hospital in court, arguing that the Church
Amendment contains an implied private right of action. This would allow the doctor to demand
damages and/or reinstatement. Alternatively, as the Church Amendment is a condition on spending, the
physician may demand the withdrawal of federal funds based on the hospital's violation of the
Amendment's provisions. The withdrawal of federal funds, however, is a drastic remedy, and one that is
rarely used.
87. 364 F. Supp. 799 (D. Idaho, 1973), aff'd, 520 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1975).
88. See id. at 800. Note that the Directives of the Mercy Medical Center indicated a prohibition
against abortion and sterilization in a hospital setting, meaning in any hospital. Thus, like the situation
faced by Dr. Atkinson, the prohibition was not specific to the Catholic hospital in which Dr. Watkins
worked, and as such, could be argued to be a violation of the Church Amendment.
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for the performance of sterilization procedures or abortions.,,89  The court
viewed Dr. Watkins' claim as demanding that he be reinstated and allowed to
perform abortions or sterilization procedures in that hospital. At the close of
the opinion, the court noted, "Dr. Watkins is free to believe that sterilization
services should be provided for the public and to perform them anywhere he is
able." 90 While this appears to be merely dicta in the district court opinion, it is
clear from the Ninth Circuit opinion that, as a result of the hospital's violation
of the non-discrimination provision in the Church Amendment, Dr. Watkins
was reinstated at the hospital with the understanding that he would not perform
abortions or sterilizations in that hospital facility. 9' The Ninth Circuit affirmed
the district court's denial of damages and unrestricted use of the hospital's
facilities, finding that the lower court was correct in determining that there was
no state action involved and hence no jurisdiction under § 1983. Thus, the only
case to address the Church Amendment's non-discrimination provision appears
to have applied it, albeit in dicta, as this article suggests, with very little
discussion of its constitutionality or the appropriate means of reliance on it.
E. Courts Are Already Moving in This Direction
While only one court, in Watkins, has so far relied on the Church
Amendment's non-discrimination provision, we may derive some assurances
about the direction courts will go in the future from the way in which courts
have dealt with the issue of contraceptive coverage. As state legislatures begin
to require contraceptive coverage in health plans within their states, religiously
affiliated institutions have begun to demand refusal clauses that would exempt
them from such laws because of their religious beliefs. Despite these demands,
however, the courts and legislatures have rejected such requests. In California,
for example, the legislature refused to exempt religious institutions with diverse
work forces from this requirement, a decision upheld by a California appeals
court in Catholic Charities v. Superior Court.92 Such an exemption, the court
found, would have meant "imposing the employers' religious beliefs on
89. Id. at 801.
90. Id. at 803. While this quote did not specifically refer to the Church Amendment's non-
discrimination provision, elsewhere in its opinion, the court noted that Congress has taken the position,
as evidenced by the Church Amendment, that in addition to supporting the religious freedom of the
hospital, "at the same time, the hospital cannot discharge a staff member who religiously or morally
believes that [abortion] services should be performed." Id.
91. See Watkins v. Mercy Med. Cr., 520 F.2d at 895-896. Referring to the district court, the Ninth
Circuit stated:
However, the court found that appellee had violated 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 by removing
appellant from staff because of his belief that sterilizations and abortions should be
performed. The judgment provided for the restoration of Dr. Watkins to staff privileges on
condition that he not perform abortions or sterilizations contrary to the hospital's rule.
Id.
92. 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001), petition for review granted, 31 P.3d 1271 (Cal.
2001).
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employees who did not share those beliefs," which would, in turn, "undermine
the anti-discrimination and public welfare goals of the prescription coverage
statutes. 93 This case in the contraceptive coverage context suggests that courts
are likely to prohibit religious institutions from imposing their beliefs on their
diverse employees in other contexts as well. The use of the Church
Amendment to prevent discrimination against physicians and other health care
professionals who disagree with the religious convictions of the hospitals at
which they work is certainly in keeping with this developing judicial trend.
III. FINDING AN IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION IN THE CHURCH
AMENDMENT
While it is clear that the Church Amendment's statutory language affords
protections for the doctors described above, the notion that a court will interpret
this statute to include a private right of action is slightly more complex. In light
of the current Supreme Court's disfavor for implied rights of action, it is
important to examine this point when attempting to use the Church Amendment
as a remedy for individual adverse employment actions.94
As Justice Powell noted in his dissent in Cannon v. University of Chicago,
"[i]mplied private rights of action are judicially inferred rights to relief from
injuries caused by another's violation of a federal statute." 95 If a statute does
not contain enforcement provisions within its text, a question arises as to how a
court should determine the remedy for the statute's violation when a party is
adversely affected by that violation. Courts dealing with implied rights of
action often, as a starting point, look to Texas and Pacific Railway Company v.
Rigsby, one of the earliest cases dealing with this issue, in which the Court
inferred a private right of action in the Federal Safety Appliance Acts.96 In
commenting on the origins of this principle, the Court famously noted:
A disregard of the command of the statute is a wrongful act, and where
it results in damage to one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted, the right to recover the damages from the party in
default is implied, according to a doctrine of the common law
expressed . . . in these words: 'So in every case where a statute
enacts or prohibits a thing for the benefit of a person, he shall have a
remedy upon the same statute for the thing enacted for his advantage,
93. Id. at 183. See also Weiss Testimony, supra note 22, at 17; St. Agnes Hosp. v. Riddick, 748 F.
Supp. 319 (D. Md. 1990).
94. The current Supreme Court has denied or limited implied private rights of action in numerous
cases since the late 1970s. See e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Reddington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Guardians
Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of the City of New York, 463 U.S. 582 (1983); Alexander v. Sandoval,
532 U.S. 275 (2001).
95. 441 U.S. 677, 730 n.l (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
96. 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
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or for the recompense of a wrong done to him contrary to the said
law. 
97
For many years after Rigsby, courts relied on this notion to imply private rights
of action into numerous pieces of federal legislation.
As the law developed, however, the court established a more specific
analysis for determining when to imply a private right of action. In 1975, the
Supreme Court revisited this issue, establishing a four-factor test in Cort v.
Ash. 98 In Cort, the plaintiff brought a claim against a corporation of which he
was a stockholder, alleging a violation of a criminal statute that prohibited
corporations from making contributions or expenditures in connection with
specified federal elections, and arguing that he was entitled to damages as a
result of this violation.99 In response, the Court introduced four factors to
consider when evaluating an implied private right of action:
[1] First, is the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted? . . . [2] Second, is there any indication of
legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or
deny one? [3] Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of
the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? [4]
And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state
law . . . so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action
based solely on federal law?'00
Upon applying this test to the facts in Cort, the Supreme Court found no
implied private right of action.' 0'
In 1979, the Court decided another case in which it did imply a private
right of action for a sex discrimination statute. In Cannon v. University of
Chicago, the Court found an implied private right of action in Title IX, the
statute that bars sex discrimination in educational facilities that receive federal
funding.'0 2  Because Title IX's non-discrimination mandate was based on
97. Id. at 39.
98. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
99. Id. at 73.
100. Id. at 78.
101. Id. at 68. The Court first concluded that the general criminal statute at issue in the case did not
suggest a specific group of people for whose benefit the statute was enacted. The criminal statute's
basic purpose was instead "to assure that federal elections are 'free from the power of money."' Id. at
81-82. Second, the Court found no suggestion in the legislative history of an intent to create a remedy
for private shareholders under this act. Id. at 82-83. Third, the Court concluded that the creation of such
a remedy would not further the primary congressional purpose behind the act, that of lessening the
influence of corporate funds in federal elections. Id. at 84. Fourth, the Court determined that given that
corporations are themselves created under and governed by state law, it was wholly appropriate to
relegate the original plaintiff and others like him to the remedies provided by state law. Id.
102. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). It is important to note that Cannon was decided prior to Touche Ross &
Co. v. Reddington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) in which the Court further narrowed the possibility of finding an
implied private right of action. However, the Court in Touche Ross explicitly distinguished that case
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congressional funding of educational programs, the Court of Appeals in
Cannon held that the only enforcement mechanism for Title IX was found in §
902 of the act, which established a procedure for the termination of federal
financial support for institutions that violated the non-discrimination
requirements. Thus, the Court of Appeals was unwilling to imply a private
remedy in addition to the procedure described in § 902.103 However, upon
applying the four factors of the Cort test, the Supreme Court disagreed and
found an implied private right of action in Title IX despite the statute's nature
as a condition on federal spending.
In assessing the first Cort factor, the Court found that the plaintiff, a
woman who was denied admission to the medical schools at two private
universities, was a member of the specific class (women) for whose benefit the
statute was enacted.1° 4 In looking to the second factor, the legislative history,
the Court noted:
We must recognize, however, that the legislative history of a statute
that does not expressly create or deny a private remedy will typically
be silent or ambiguous on the question. Therefore, in situations such
as the present one 'in which it is clear that federal law has granted a
class of persons certain rights, it is not necessary to show an intention
to create a private cause of action, although an explicit purpose to deny
such cause of action would be controlling."
0 5
The Court did, in fact, fird legislative history that supported an implied
private right of action for Title IX. The statute was modeled on Title VI,
which, at the time of the enactment of Title IX, was being interpreted by the
lower courts to include an implied private right of action.'0 6  Despite this
discovery of congressional intent, the Court recognized that Title IX was
unique in its legislative history and hence saw fit to include the above
statement, suggesting that an intent to create a private right of action need not
be expressly stated in the legislative history in order for courts to imply it.
Furthermore, the Court indicated that, when assessing congressional intent, it
was appropriate for a court to consider the time period and contemporary
jurisprudence on which Congress relied when enacting the statute in question.
In the period prior to 1975, before Cort v. Ash created a stricter means of
assessing a remedy, the courts implied many private rights of action into
statutes that did not expressly contain them. Thus, the Cannon court continued:
from Cannon and other cases in which the statute in question prohibited certain conduct or created
federal rights in favor of private parties, thereby leaving the holding in Cannon intact. See Touche Ross,
442 U.S. at 569.
103. See Cannon, 411 U.S. at 683-85.
104. Id. at 690-94.
105. Id. at 694 (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 82 (1975)).
106. See id. at 696 n.19.
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We, of course, adhere to the strict approach followed in our recent
cases, but our evaluation of congressional action in 1972 must take
into account its contemporary legal context. In sum, it is not only
appropriate but also realistic to presume that Congress was thoroughly
familiar with these unusually important precedents from this and other
federal courts and that it expected its enactment to be interpreted in
conformity with them. 1
07
In considering the third factor, the statutory purpose, the court noted that
when a private right of action "is necessary or at least helpful to the
accomplishment of the statutory purpose, the Court is decidedly receptive to its
implication under the statute."' 0 8 Furthermore, the Court suggested that with
regard to statutes that act as conditions on funding, a consideration of
appropriate remedies is necessary. The withdrawal of federal funding, the
court noted, is a severe remedy and may not provide an appropriate means of
protecting the individual when an isolated violation has occurred. A private
right of action would help accomplish the goal of non-discrimination in such
legislation without resorting to a severe and extreme remedy.'°9
Finally, in assessing the fourth factor, whether the subject matter is more
appropriately left to the states, the Court found that protecting individuals
against discrimination has, since the Civil War, been a prerogative of the
federal government. Additionally, as the non-discrimination requirement in
Title IX was based on the expenditure of federal funds, it was surely a case for
the federal courts." 0 Having found that the statute met all four Cort factors, the
Cannon court concluded that it was appropriate to imply a private right of
action in Title IX.
While Cannon is not the most recent analysis of implied rights of action by
the Supreme Court, the statute at issue in that case is the most analogous to the
Church Amendment."' Like Title IX, the Church Amendment is a condition
on federal spending that seeks to protect individuals from discrimination. Like
Title IX, the Church Amendment's non-discrimination provision seeks to
protect a specific class of persons, namely health care professionals who work
in sectarian hospitals but do not share the religious beliefs of those institutions.
Like Title IX, an implied private right of action would assist in advancing the
legislative purpose of the amendment, the prevention of discrimination suffered
by health care professionals who do not share the religious beliefs of the
hospitals at which they work. The threat of a civil lawsuit surely advances this
purpose. Additionally, the withdrawal of federal funds from a hospital is a
107. Id. at 698-99.
108. Id. at 703.
109. Id. at 705-706.
110. See id. at 708-709.
111. See infra pp. 159-62 for discussion of the more recent cases on implied private rights of
action.
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severe remedy. Hence, as the Court similarly indicated in Cannon, a finding of
a private right of action for doctors at sectarian hospitals is a far more
appropriate remedy for an isolated violation of the statute.' 12 Finally, like Title
IX, the Church Amendment is a condition on federal spending that deals with
discrimination against individuals and the protection of those individuals'
religious and moral convictions as well as their rights of free speech and
association. Surely these are matters appropriately dealt with by the federal
government.
Shortly after the decision in Cannon, the Court, in 1979, returned to the
question of implied private rights of action in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,
this time clarifying in its decision that the focus of the court's inquiry should be
the determination of congressional intent."13 While noting that the Cort test
established four factors, the Touche Ross court insisted that these factors were
not of equal weight and that at least three of those factors were primarily used
to establish legislative intent. 14 The Court further noted that in cases where a
private right of action was not expressly provided but was implied, "the statute
in question at least prohibited certain conduct or created federal rights in favor
of private parties.""1 5 Additionally, the Court suggested that where the statute
in question is flanked by provisions of the same act that do provide private
rights of action, the court should assume that when Congress intended to
provide a private right of action, it did so expressly." 6 Thus, with the Touche
Ross decision, the Court further narrowed the test for implying a private right
of action, continuing the process, which had begun with the Cort decision in
1975, of limiting the number of statutes in which an implied right could be
found.
Despite the obvious analogy to Cannon, the Church Amendment should be
considered in light of Touche Ross as well, as it was decided in the same year
as Cannon. Touche Ross mandates that courts look first and foremost for a
showing of congressional intent."l 7 The Court in Touche Ross indicated that
when a court answers the first two factors in the negative, that (1) the plaintiff
is not in the special class for whose benefit the statute was enacted, and (2) that
112. While the Federal Government has the power to withdraw funding should a recipient violate
the conditions on the funding, the government has virtually never done so, or even threatened to do so.
See e-mail from Sylvia Law, Professor, NYU School of Law, to author (Dec. 10, 2002) (on file with
author). As a result, an implied private right of action is the only real means of giving the Church
Amendment's non-discrimination provision its intended effect.
113. Touche Ross &Co. v. Redington,442 U.S. 560 (1979).
114. Id. at 575-576 (noting that the first three factors, (1) the language and focus of the statute, (2)
the legislative history, and (3) the purpose of the statute, all help the court to determine congressional
intent in this matter).
115. Id. at 569.
116. Id. at 571.
117. Id.at575.
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the legislative history does not indicate any congressional intent to create a
private right of action, the inquiry should end there.
1 8
Under the Touche Ross scheme, the Church Amendment provides a unique
case in which the first Cort factor would be answered in the positive, while the
second factor, the existence of evidence of congressional intent to imply a
private right of action, while positive, is minimal. The would-be plaintiff (a
pro-choice physician) is certainly within the class for whose especial benefit
the statute was enacted. The Church Amendment clearly contains a non-
discrimination provision aimed at the protection of health care professionals.
The legislative history, while positive, is sparse on the question of
congressional intent with respect to a private right of action.
The House, Senate, and Conference Reports make no mention whatsoever
of the remedy for a violation of the non-discrimination provision of the
amendment. "9  The only mention of a remedy can be found in the
Congressional Record of the Senate floor debates during which Senator Javits
of New York proposed the non-discrimination provision as an addition to
Senator Church's amendment. 12 When asked by Senator Pastore if there was a
penalty for the violation of this provision, Senator Javits responded that there
was an affirmative benefit to participating in a federal program: the funding.
121
"[The amendment] qualifies the benefit by saying that if they do discriminate
against the doctor who is in their hospital because he has done something they
do not approve of in the other hospital, we have the authority to deprive them
of that benefit," 122 Javits stated, later adding, "but suppose that hospital fires a
doctor because they do not approve of what he did in another hospital. I say
they do not have the right to fire him, and they may lose the benefits of Federal
funds because they are discriminating against a doctor."' 23  Senator Javits'
comments indicate a recognition that firing doctors for such reasons would be
violating their rights and might also risk the withdrawal of federal funds.
In interpreting this meager legislative history, it is important to consider the
Cannon court's approach to legislative history on this issue.1 24 That court
noted that the absence of clear congressional intent in legislative history is to be
expected where there is no express mention of a remedy in the text. 125
Furthermore, the Cannon court suggested that it was important to consider the
time period and contemporary jurisprudence that was in existence when the
118. Id. at 576.
119. See House Report No. 93-227 (1973) reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1464, 1473; Senate
Report No. 93-381 (1974) reprinted in 1974 USCCAN 3634, 3655 and 3674.




124. The Cannon court's approach to interpreting legislative history was left intact by the Touche
Ross decision, which merely re-focused the entire inquiry on legislative intent. Thus, it seems
appropriate to use the Cannon rationale even while applying the Touche Ross analysis to the question.
125. See Cannon, 411 U.S. at 694, 698-699.
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statute in question was enacted. The Church Amendment was passed in 1973,
which was only one year after Title IX was enacted. As such, the Church
Amendment was enacted in the period before the Court decided Cort v. Ash,
the case that initially restricted the recognition of implied rights of action.
Thus, as the Cannon court found with respect to Title IX, it is safe to assume
that the Congress that enacted the Church Amendment relied on the pre-Cort
decisions to presume that an implied right of action would be found in the
statute without any express language in its text. 26
Furthermore, as the Touche Ross court explicitly stated, those cases that
have found implied private rights of action invariably involve a statute which
"prohibited certain conduct or created federal rights in favor of private
parties." 127 The Church Amendment easily fits this category as well. The non-
discrimination provision of the Church Amendment expressly prohibits
discrimination against pro-choice health care professionals who work in
hospitals which do not share their convictions. The statute prohibits specific
conduct including "discrimination in the employment, promotion, or
termination of any physician or other health care personnel., 128 As a result, the
Church Amendment fits the description provided by the Touche Ross opinion
of a case in which an implied private right of action is appropriate. A health
care professional who faces discrimination in employment as a result of her
abortion-related actions or beliefs expressed outside the hospital can have a
private cause of action against the sectarian hospital at which she is employed.
Before concluding this section, it is important to consider recent Supreme
Court jurisprudence on private rights of action in order to determine whether
the jurisprudence has changed in a way that will affect the use of the Church
Amendment. In 2001, the Supreme Court decided Alexander v. Sandoval, its
most recent decision on implied rights of action in the area of anti-
discrimination legislation.129 In Sandoval, the plaintiff, a non-English speaker,
claimed that Alabama's policy of only providing the driver's license exams in
English was a violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
prohibits discrimination based on national origin in programs that receive
certain government funding.'30 The Sandoval court held that no private right of
action could be implied in Title VI to challenge regulations that discriminate by
way of disparate impact.131 In coming to this conclusion, the Court relied on
Cannon as well as Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission of the
City of New York.'3 1 The Sandoval court noted that Cannon's finding of an
126. See id. at 698-99.
127. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 569 (1979).
128. 42 U.S.C. §300a-7 (West. Supp. 1991) [The Church Amendment].
129. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
130. Id.
131. Id. at293.
132. Id. at 276.
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implied right of action rested on the assumption that the University of Chicago
had intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. As such, the Court in
Cannon had no occasion to consider whether the right reached regulations that
barred disparate impact discrimination. 133 Furthermore, the Guardian court
had held that with respect to Title VI, an implied private right of action could
only allow the recovery of compensatory damages in cases of intentional
discrimination. 134 The Sandoval court, after considering the specific provisions
of Title VI, concluded that it would be inappropriate to imply a private right of
action to enforce disparate impact regulations.1
35
While Sandoval is somewhat similar to a Church Amendment case, as both
deal with implying private rights of action in anti-discrimination statutes based
on federal funding, a Church Amendment case is easily distinguishable from
Sandoval. Under the Church Amendment, an entity receiving federal funding
under the Public Health Service Act may not intentionally discriminate against
a health care professional based on his or her actions or beliefs regarding
abortion. There is no mention or suggestion of disparate impact discrimination.
As a result, while Sandoval limits the future of Title VI disparate impact suits,
it should have no real impact on the potential to imply a private right of action
in the Church Amendment. Furthermore, because Sandoval is such a specific
decision that distinguishes types of discrimination, it would be imprudent to
speculate about the future of the Court's jurisprudence on implied rights of
action based on its holding. An implied right of action in the Church
Amendment should therefore be secure.
IV. THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT OF 1993 AND ITS POTENTIAL
TO ERODE THE CHURCH AMENDMENTS' PROTECTIONS
In December of 2000 and January of 2001, when the anti-abortion Internet
community picked up the story of Dr. Yogendra Shah, there was some debate
as to whether the hospital could terminate him entirely or merely remove him
from his position as chief of the obstetrics and gynecology department. 136 As
the National Catholic Register reported, the hospital's legal counsel suggested
that firing Dr. Shah because he performed abortions at a private clinic would be
133. Id. at 282.
134. See Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission of the City of New York, 463 U.S.
582, 584 (1983). The Guardian court found that in disparate impact cases, "in the absence of proof of
discriminatory animus," compensatory relief should not be awarded but injunctive and declaratory relief
were still available. Id.
135. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at293.
136. This article argues that both termination and demotion are prohibited in this context by the
Church Amendment.
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a violation of the Church Amendment. 137 A December 7, 2000 statement by
the Catholic Diocese of Springfield, Illinois warned that "to protest the law that
protects Dr. Shah... would be provoking litigation that might endanger the
legal right of Catholic hospitals to refuse to perform abortions.' ' 138 Thus, the
hospital and the Catholic community in Springfield worried that should the
hospital successfully challenge the Church Amendment's non-discrimination
provision, the courts would also invalidate the other provisions of the
amendment which serve to protect the religious freedom of the sectarian
hospital.
In responding to this fear on the part of the Diocese, Richard Myers, a
professor at Ave Maria School of Law, suggested that the hospital could
challenge only the non-discrimination provision of the Church Amendment by
arguing that it was a violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993 (RFRA).139 RFRA reinvigorated a strict test for assessing rules of general
applicability that, in practice, infringe on religious activities or beliefs. It is the
contention of this article that RFRA, while constitutional as applied to federal
law, would not restrict the protections afforded by the Church Amendment.
Congress passed RFRA in response to the Supreme Court's highly
controversial decision in Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith. 140 The Court in Smith decided that the denial of
unemployment benefits to Native American employees who had ingested
peyote as a sacrament during a religious ceremony was not a violation of the
federal free exercise clause.' 4' In so doing, the Smith court, by a five-four
majority, rejected the application of the Sherbert v. Verner142  "compelling
interest" test to laws that only incidentally prohibit or burden religious
practices. 143 The response to the Smith decision was an uproar on the parts of
both liberals and conservatives who were concerned about the restrictions on
religious freedom created by the decision. The congressional response was the
enactment of RFRA, which was signed into law by President Clinton. The
passage of RFRA re-invigorated the Sherbert test for statutes of general
applicability. Thus, if a plaintiff argued that a statute incidentally caused a
137. Eve Tushnet, Catholic Hospital Says It's Stuck With Abortionist, NAT'L CATHOLIC REG. (Jan.
7, 2001) at http:/Avww.ncregister.com/RegisterNews/Tushnet-Abortionist.htm (last visited Nov. 11,
2003).
138. Id.
139. Id. Richard Myers referred to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. §
2000bb-1 (Deering, LEXIS through November 2003) [hereinafter RFRA].
140. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
141. Id. See also S. REP. 103-111 at 4 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1894-95.
142. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that for a law that directly burdened religion
to be constitutional, it must pass the "compelling interest" test, which required a finding that a
compelling state interest justified the burden on religion and that the law in question was the least
restrictive means of furthering that interest).
143. Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, Kennedy, White, and Stevens made up the majority in this case.
Justice O'Connor, while concurring in the result, vehemently opposed the rejection of the compelling
interest test. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun dissented. See Smith, 494 U.S. 872.
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substantial burden on his free exercise of religion, the government could only
justify such a statute's application to this plaintiff if it was "in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest and [was] the least restrictive means of
furthering that compelling governmental interest."
144
A. RFRA and the Church Amendment as Competing Statutes
The first question that must be addressed in assessing RFRA's implications
for the use of the Church Amendment is whether RFRA trumps the Church
Amendment, as both are pieces of federal legislation, presumably standing on
equal ground. Both the case law on the issue of competing statutes and the text
of RFRA itself suggest that RFRA prevails over the Church Amendment. For
example, the Fifth Circuit has suggested that "[ulnder the usual rules of
statutory construction, where there is a conflict between an earlier statute and a
subsequent enactment, the subsequent enactment governs.' 45 However, in the
same opinion, the court also noted that "the cardinal rule of construction is that
repeals by implication are not favored."'146 As such, it is important to look at
the statutory text and legislative history of RFRA as well. The Senate Report
regarding RFRA speaks directly to this point in stating that the "Act applies to
all Federal and State law, and the implementation of the law, whether statutory
or otherwise and whether adopted before or after the enactment of this Act.'
47
Finally, in EEOC v. Catholic University of America, the D.C. Circuit, while
acknowledging that legislation usually applies only prospectively, found that
the statute explicitly states that it applies to all federal law, whether enacted
before or after the enactment of RFRA.148 Thus, it is clear that despite RFRA's
enactment twenty-one years after the Church Amendment, should the two laws
be found to be irreconcilable, RFRA would prevail.
B. The Constitutionality of RFRA
In assessing RFRA's impact on the Church Amendment it is vital to
consider the issue of RFRA's constitutionality in general. This issue was
resolved, in part, by the Supreme Court in 1997 in City of Boerne v. Flores.'
4 9
The Court held that in enacting RFRA, Congress overstepped its authority
144. RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b) (Deering, LEXIS through November 2003).
145. Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. S. Ry. Co., 543 F.2d 534, 539 (5th Cir. 1976). See also
United States v. Tynen, 78 U.S. 88, 92 (1870) ("When there are two acts on the same subject, the rule is
to give effect to both if possible. But if the two are repugnant in any of their provisions, the latter act,
without any repealing clause, operates to the extent of the repugnancy as a repeal of the first.").
146. See Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 543 F. 2d at 539.
147. S. Rep. 103-111 at 4 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1882, 1893. As will be
discussed later in the article, RFRA no longer applies to state law. See discussion infra pp. 165-67.
148. EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of America, 83 F.3d 455, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
149. City ofBoeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
[Vol. 15: 13 5
Separation of Church and Hospital
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 150  Flores suggests that
Congress's power under the Fourteenth Amendment is restricted to laws of a
remedial nature that enforce the Amendment's provisions regarding
constitutional privileges, due process, and equal protection. The Flores court
suggested that Congress lacks the power to enact substantive legislation that
goes beyond remedies, stating, "[l]egislation which alters the meaning of the
Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the Clause. Congress does
not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is."' 15' Thus,
Congress may not enact legislation that seeks to define and interpret what
constitutes a violation of constitutional rights and privileges but may only
enforce the provisions of the Amendment as it stands. 52 The Court further
suggested that while remedial legislation is appropriate in cases like the Voting
Rights Act where there is a history of flagrant constitutional violations, no such
historical record existed that would justify RFRA's enactment. As such, RFRA
could not be considered remedial as it was so out of proportion to any remedial
object. 153 Thus, with Flores, the Court dealt a severe blow to RFRA and its
potential to revise the jurisprudence on freedom of religion.
However, despite this decision, a number of lower courts have interpreted
Flores as an invalidation of RFRA's application only to state laws, upholding
its validity as applied to federal law. Both the Eighth and Tenth Circuits have
upheld RFRA as applied to federal laws, namely bankruptcy laws and Bureau
of Prison regulations, respectively. 54  These courts have insisted that in
enacting RFRA, Congress relied on its powers under the Fourteenth
Amendment to apply the statute to the states and on its powers under Article I,
Section 8 of the United States Constitution to apply it to the federal
government. Therefore, according to the Eighth and Tenth Circuits, when the
Supreme Court found RFRA to be outside of Congress's powers under the
Fourteenth Amendment, its decision applied only to RFRA's implications for
state law as, by its terms, the Fourteenth Amendment is applicable only to the
states.
In Young v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church, the Eighth Circuit originally
held that RFRA applied to the federal bankruptcy laws.' 5 When the Supreme
150. Id. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § I reads, in part: "No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities or citizens of the United States..." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV § 5 allows Congress to have "power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of
this article."
151. Flores, 521 U.S. at 519.
152. Id.
153. See Flores, 521 U.S. at 532-33.
154. See Young v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church, 141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 1998) (regarding
bankruptcy laws). See also Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950 (10th Cir. 2001) (regarding Bureau of
Prison Regulations). Note that this question has not been decided by the Supreme Court and several
circuits have declined to reach this issue in their analyses. See, e.g., Henderson v. Kennedy, 253 F.3d 12
(D.C. Cir. 2001).
155. 141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 1998).
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Court received this case, it vacated the decision and remanded for
reconsideration in light of Flores, which had recently been decided. The
Eighth Circuit upheld its original decision, this time on the grounds that RFRA
was constitutional as applied to federal law and that the constitutional part of
the act was severable from the part declared to be invalid by the Supreme
Court. The court opined, "[w]here the Supreme Court strikes down one portion
of a statute, we must presume that other portions of the statute remain in effect
'unless it is evident that the Legislature would not have enacted those
provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is not.'
' 56
In this case, the court reasoned, Congress's goal in enacting RFRA was to
protect religious liberty as fully as possible from encroachment by all
government actors. There is nothing in the text or legislative history to suggest
that Congress would not want RFRA extended to federal legislation even if it
did not apply to the states. 157 With regard to the notion that the enactment of
RFRA constituted a violation of the separation of powers doctrine, the Eighth
Circuit concluded that while the interpretation of the Constitution is solely
within the power of the judiciary, Congress may legislate to provide greater
statutory protection of individual liberties than that granted by the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the constitutional protection. 158  The Religious
Freedom Restoration Act can thus be interpreted as an expansion of the
protection of free exercise of religion in federal statutes, an expansion that is
legitimately within congressional authority. Finally, the Eighth Circuit
concluded that RFRA was not a violation of the Establishment Clause as it has
the secular purpose of protecting the Free Exercise Clause, does not advance a
particular religion, and was designed to prevent excessive entanglement
between government and religion by limiting the impact neutral laws have on
religion. 1
59
The Tenth Circuit, in Kikumura v. Hurley, similarly held that the
application of RFRA to federal law is distinguishable from its application to
state and local law, which the Supreme Court declared to be unconstitutional in
Flores. 160 In Kikumura, the plaintiff, a federal prisoner, brought suit against the
prison wardens for denying him pastoral visits, claiming that this denial
constituted a violation of his rights under the First and Fifth Amendments as
well as under RFRA. 6' Like the Young court, the Tenth Circuit held that
156. Id. at 859 (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 931-32 (1983)).
157. See id.
158. See id. at 859-60 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176-77 (1803)). The Court cited a
number of examples of such statutory protection including the Privacy Protection Act of 1980, 42
U.S.C. § 2000aa (Deering, LEXIS through November 2003) (giving greater protection to journalists
against searches and seizures) and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Deering,
LEXIS through November 2003) (equating employment discrimination based on pregnancy with
employment discrimination based on gender). See id. at 860.
159. See id. at 862-63.
160. Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950 (10th Cir. 2001).
161. Id. at 953.
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Congress's power to apply RFRA to federal laws arose out of its Article I
powers and, as such, was not affected by the Flores decision regarding the
Fourteenth Amendment. 162 The Tenth Circuit further held that "when a portion
of a statute is declared unconstitutional, the constitutional portions of the statute
are presumed severable" unless it is clear that congressional intent was to enact
both portions or neither. 63  Because the court found no such congressional
intent, it found RFRA as applied to federal laws to be severable from the state-
focused portion of RFRA and constitutional in its own right.
Thus, at this point, both the Eighth and the Tenth Circuits, the only circuits
to have dealt with this issue, have concluded that RFRA remains valid as
applied to federal law. As such, it is important to consider RFRA's impact on
the Church Amendment, which is a piece of federal legislation.
C. RFRA 's Lack of Impact on the Church Amendment
RFRA mandates that if a rule of general applicability is found to
substantially burden a person's religious practice, that rule is only justified if it
furthers a compelling state interest and if it is the least restrictive means of
furthering that interest. 164 As the remainder of this article will demonstrate,
RFRA has no impact on the Church Amendment because, should the
Amendment be viewed as a rule of general applicability, the non-discrimination
provision in the Church Amendment cannot be considered to be a "substantial
burden" on the exercise of religion.165 Even if the Church Amendment were to
be considered a "substantial burden," there is clearly a compelling state interest
advanced by the Church Amendment, namely the protection of a physician's
rights of freedom of speech and freedom of religion. The Amendment
therefore clearly meets the least restrictive means test as well.
162. Id. at 959.
163. Id.
164. See RFRA § 2000bb-1.
165. There is some debate as to the definition of "rules of general applicability" and whether the
Church Amendment qualifies as such a rule. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act only applies to
rules of general applicability because the "compelling state interest test" created by Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963), still applies to laws that directly burden the free exercise of religion. Thus, if the
Church Amendment is viewed as a law that directly burdens the free exercise right of religious hospitals,
it must face the same "compelling state interest" test that RFRA has reinvigorated for laws that do not
directly burden religious exercise. Whether or not the Church Amendment is viewed as such a neutral
rule of general applicability, this section argues that it passes the "compelling interest" test that is
required either by RFRA or by Sherbert. This article addresses the argument that the Church
Amendment violates RFRA because this is the argument that has most frequently been advanced by the
religiously affiliated hospitals.
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The "Substantial Burden "Analysis
The "substantial burden" factor is the first inquiry to consider when
assessing RFRA's impact on a statute. Under this test, courts have generally
inquired whether the "government has placed a substantial burden on the
,,166observation of a central religious belief or practice.... Furthermore, courts
often look to whether the plaintiff can reasonably claim that the regulation has
forced him to engage in conduct that his religion forbids or has prevented him
from engaging in conduct that his religion requires. 167 In Planned Parenthood
Association of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Walton, the Court held that the
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE) did not violate RFRA as it
merely prohibited the use of force or threat of force or the physical obstruction
of a clinic entrance. 168 Concluding that the plaintiffs, abortion protestors, were
not arguing that their religion mandated the use of force or threat of force, the
court found that their religious practice was not substantially burdened by the
statute's prohibition.1
69
Similarly, in assessing the "substantial burden" element, the court in Storm
v. Town of Woodstock inquired whether the state had "put substantial pressure
on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.' 7 0  In this
case, the court found that while a prohibition on nighttime parking near a field
where plaintiffs gathered for "full moon gatherings" made it less convenient for
them to gather for their service, it did not substantially burden their religious
practice.' 7' Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit in Goodall by Goodall v. Stafford
County School Board held that a law or policy operating to make a person's
religious practice more expensive does not in itself constitute a substantial
burden for the purposes of RFRA.172 Finally, the Supreme Court of California
relied, in part, on this notion when it decided Smith v. Fair Employment and
Housing Commission.'73 In Smith, the court held that the Fair Employment and
Housing Commission's decision prohibiting discrimination based on marital
status in the rental of property did not substantially burden the landlord's
166. Henderson v. Kennedy, 253 F.3d 12, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 986 (2002)
(holding that a ban on the selling of message-bearing t-shirts on the National Mall did not substantially
burden the religious practices of Evangelical Christians and hence did not violate RFRA).
167. See id. at 16. See also Goodall by Goodall v. Stafford County Sch. Bd., 60 F.3d 168, 172-73
(4th Cir. 1995).
168. 949 F. Supp. 290 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
169. See id. at 296.
170. 994 F. Supp. 139, 146 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 477 (2d Cir.
1996)). Note that while this case was decided before the Supreme Court invalidated RFRA as applied to
state law, it nevertheless provides insight into the appropriate interpretation of "substantial burden"
when RFRA is applied to federal law. See also Goodall, 60 F.3d at 171 (noting that RFRA did not
indicate a definition for the term "substantial burden" and so it is appropriate to look to pre-RFRA
religious freedom case law to determine its meaning).
171. 994 F. Supp. 290.
172. 60F.3dat171.
173. 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996).
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religious practice. 174 The landlord claimed that renting to a non-married, co-
habiting couple would violate her religious beliefs. The court concluded that
the Commission's decision did not impose a substantial burden, as the landlord
had the option of selling the property and earning income elsewhere if she did
not want to comply with the Commission's non-discrimination rules.
175
Furthermore, the court found it to be particularly important that the rights of
third parties were involved in this case, opining, "the parties have not brought
to our attention a single case in which the Supreme Court exempted a religious
objector from the operation of a general law when the court recognized that the
exemption would detrimentally affect the rights of third parties."
'1 76
Based on the case law described above, it is clear that the Church
Amendment should not be considered by the courts to be a substantial burden
on a hospital's exercise of its religion. The definition of "substantial burden"
suggested by the court in Henderson v. Kennedy referred to a regulation that
forces someone to engage in conduct that his religion forbids or one that
prevents him from engaging in conduct that his religion requires. 177  The
Church Amendment's non-discrimination mandate neither forces a hospital to
engage in conduct contrary to its religion nor does it prevent conduct that the
hospital believes is mandated by its religion. Because a doctor's right under the
Church Amendment extends only to actions outside of a sectarian hospital
facility and because the first part of the Church Amendment insures that a
hospital will never be mandated to perform an abortion or sterilization contrary
to its religious or moral conviction, hospitals cannot claim that their exercise of
religion is burdened by the prohibition against discrimination.
Similarly, under both Henderson and Walton's interpretations of
"substantial burden,"' 78 a hospital could not argue that a central tenet of its
religious practice is violated because of the Church Amendment. Much as in
Walton, where the abortion protestors could not claim that the use of force at
abortion clinics was mandated by their religion, a sectarian hospital cannot
claim that the demotion or termination of doctors due to their performance of
abortions outside of the facility or to the beliefs they hold respecting abortion is
mandated by Catholicism or any other religion.
Finally, as both the Goodall and Smith decisions suggest, 179 a regulation
that makes religious practice more expensive is not considered to substantially
burden that practice. In the case of the Church Amendment, the statute is
merely a condition on federal funding. A hospital always maintains the right to
forego the federal funds if it wishes to discriminate without government
174. Id. at 929.
175. Id. at 925.
176. Id. at 928.
177. 253 F.3d at 17.
178. See discussion supra p. 168-69.
179. See Goodall, 60 F.3d at 171; see also Smith, 913 P.2d at 925.
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intervention. While this may be a more expensive option for hospitals, it is not
so severe as to constitute a substantial burden.8 0
The Smith case from the California Supreme Court further suggests that if
the exemption of a religious objector from a law of general applicability
restricts the rights of third parties, the law is not to be considered a substantial
burden on the religious objector. As with the regulation at issue in Smith,
exempting a sectarian hospital from the Church Amendment because it burdens
the hospital's right of free exercise would substantially affect the rights of the
physician, a third party in this scenario, to his freedom of religion, freedom of
speech, and various other employment rights. As such, this impact on the
rights of a third party alone should be sufficient to conclude that the Church
Amendment's non-discrimination provision does not constitute a substantial
burden on a sectarian hospital's religious practice.
The "Compelling State Interest" and "Least Restrictive Means "Analyses
However, should a court conclude that the Church Amendment's mandate
not to discriminate does constitute a substantial burden on the hospital's
religious freedom, there is also a persuasive argument that this burden is
justified by the compelling state interest of protecting the physician's rights of
freedom of speech and freedom of religion. Additionally, the Church
Amendment prevents the chilling of speech and thought that might arise in an
environment where words and beliefs could lead one to lose her job.
The case law interpreting the "compelling state interest" factor supports
such a finding in the Church Amendment as well. The court in U.S. v.
Lundquist used a two-prong test to assess the government's claim that the Bald
and Golden Eagle Protection Act furthered a compelling state interest such that
180. The argument that the Church Amendment cannot be characterized as a "substantial burden"
on religious practice because it is a voluntarily assumed condition on federal funding is bolstered by a
number of Supreme Court cases that address such conditional funding provisions in Title IX and Title X.
In Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984), the Court, in addressing Title IX's ban on sex
discrimination in education, held that Congress is free to attach reasonable conditions on its federal
spending programs that the recipients of those programs are not obligated to accept without violating the
recipient's First Amendment rights. Id. at 575. Grove City was later cited by the Supreme Court in Rust
v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), in addressing the arguments of recipients of family planning funds
under Title X that the regulation's restrictions on abortion counseling and referrals violated their First
Amendment freedom of speech rights. Id. While this case was a painful blow to advocates of
reproductive rights, its holding is supportive of the constitutionality of the Church Amendment's non-
discrimination provision. In upholding Title X's restrictions on speech, the Court noted that the
restrictions were a part of a voluntary conditional funding program which recipients could forego should
they choose to reject the conditions. The Court noted that they had "never held that the Government
violates the First Amendment simply by offering that choice." Id. at 199 n.5. Furthermore, the Rust
court highlighted the fact that the regulations do not force Title X recipients to give up all of their
abortion related speech, but merely require that such speech be separate and distinct from their Title X
activities. Id. at 196. Similarly, the Church Amendment does not preclude the religiously affiliated
hospital from maintaining opposition to abortion and abortion-related procedures. It merely prohibits
employment decisions based on the beliefs or external practices of the health care professionals who are
employed there.
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the burden on plaintiffs practice of his Native American religion was
justified.181 The government argued that the interest furthered by the statute
was the preservation of eagles, which are threatened or endangered in most
states. In assessing this claim, the court sought to determine: (1) the
importance of the value underlying the government regulation and (2) the
degree of proximity and necessity that the regulation at issue bears to the
underlying value.' 82 The court in Lundquist found that the government had a
valid state interest in protecting eagles and also agreed that prohibition of
possession of eagle parts was sufficiently related to the government's legitimate
interest in preserving the species.'
8 3
In applying the above test to the Church Amendment, courts should reach a
similar conclusion. The value underlying the Church Amendment's prohibition
of discrimination, the importance of preserving freedom of speech and religion,
is uncontested. It is also clear that the means employed by the Church
Amendment, the prohibition of discrimination in employment, promotion, and
extension of staff privileges, is directly related to the underlying purpose of the
legislation.
Thus, the only remaining question is whether the means utilized by the
Church Amendment constitute the "least restrictive means" of furthering the
government's legitimate interest in protecting employee rights. In Jolly v.
Coughlin, the court assessed a Rastafarian inmate's claim that his rights under
RFRA had been violated when he was confined for refusing to submit to a TBS184
screening. The Coughlin court noted that the least restrictive means analysis
is always fact sensitive and that there is no objective test that can be applied in
all cases. Rather, the court must look at the specifics of the situation in order to
determine whether alternative means would have been sufficiently effective. 85
Additionally, the court noted that there is a fairly high burden that the
government must meet in defending its statute or regulation as the least
restrictive means. The Court in Lundquist further noted that if the compelling
state interest can be achieved despite the exemption of one individual, then the
least restrictive means test has not been met.
8 6
In applying these standards to the Church Amendment, it is again clear that
the statute passes the test. The non-discrimination provision does not forbid the
hospital from holding a particular religious belief or from enforcing that belief
in its facility. Rather, the provision simply restricts the hospital's ability to
terminate or demote employees based on their disagreements with the
181. 932 F. Supp. 1237 (D. Or. 1996).
182. Id. at 1242. See also Callahan v. Woods, 736 F.2d 1269,1274 (9th Cir. 1984).
183. See Lundquist, 932 F. Supp. at 1242. See also U.S. v. Hugs, 109 F.3d 1375 (9th Cir. 1997)
(holding that the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act does not violate RFRA as the burden on Native
American religion is justified by the government's compelling interest in preserving eagles).
184. 76 F.3d 468 (2d Cir. 1996).
185. See id. at 479.
186. See Lundquist, 932 F. Supp. at 1242. See also Callahan. 736 F.2d at 1272-73.
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hospital's religious beliefs.18 7 Additionally, as a condition on federal funding,
the hospital can reject the Church Amendment's demand entirely should it
choose to forego the funding. As such, the provision certainly qualifies as the
least restrictive means of furthering the government's interest in protecting the
freedoms of employees who work in sectarian hospitals. Thus, the RFRA
would not impact the Church Amendment and its ability to protect physicians
and other health care professionals from discrimination at the hands of the
sectarian hospitals at which they work.1
88
CONCLUSIONS
As religious health care systems gain increasingly greater power over the
health care of Americans, both patients and their doctors are deprived of basic
rights. Since the watershed decision of Roe v. Wade, patients have raised these
concerns in the media, the legislatures, and the courts. The Church
Amendment provides physicians and other health care professionals with the
possibility of using the judicial system to maintain their rights and their voices
in this debate. The Church Amendment is a constitutionally valid act of
Congress that impliedly provides health care professionals with a private right
of action against hospitals that discriminate against them because they have
performed abortions or because of their religious or moral convictions
187. Should courts, as seems reasonable to expect, imply a private right of action in the Church
Amendment, the argument that the Church Amendment meets the least restrictive means test would only
be strengthened.
188. Opponents of the use of the Church Amendment in this context may, in addition to the RFRA
argument, suggest that the amendment constitutes a violation of the hospital's freedom of expression,
pointing to Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). In Dale, the Supreme Court held that
application of New Jersey's public accommodations law to the Boy Scouts in order to force the
reinstatement of an openly gay assistant scoutmaster was a violation of the Boy Scouts' First
Amendment right of expressive association. Id. While some may attempt to argue that the hospital's
First Amendment rights are violated by the Church Amendment's non-discrimination provision, Dale is
easily distinguishable from any case that would arise under the Church Amendment. In Dale, the Court
insisted that in order to find a constitutional violation, the Boy Scouts had to be found to engage in
"expressive association." Id. at 648. While that was easily demonstrated with respect to the Boy Scouts,
a group that seeks to "instill values in young people," id. at 649, a hospital, whether religiously affiliated
or not, is in a distinctly different category. The mission of a hospital is to provide healthcare, not to
expound on political or social values. Thus, a court addressing this question should find that a hospital is
not engaged in expressive association and, as such, its employment policies can be restricted without
constitutional effect. However, should a court find that a religiously affiliated hospital is engaged in
expressive association, the restrictions created by the Church Amendment should not be seen as
significantly burdening the hospital's anti-abortion stance. See id. at 653. While in Dale the Court
found that the openly gay scoutmaster's presence in the organization would send a message that was
contrary to its pronounced mission, in the case of a religiously affiliated hospital, a pro-choice doctor
can be prevented from performing abortions or even advocating the performance of abortions while in
the hospital. The doctor's mere presence on the hospital staff would not significantly burden the
hospital's mission of providing healthcare and would not suggest that the hospital approves of abortions
simply because someone on its staff holds such beliefs. As a result, neither RFRA, nor Sherbert, nor
Dale poses a significant threat to the use of the Church Amendment to protect pro-choice physicians
working in religiously affiliated hospitals.
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respecting such legal medical procedures. The Religious Freedom Restoration
Act should not be interpreted to undermine these protections, and physicians
should be able to litigate in court based on the Church Amendment's anti-
discrimination clause. Physicians can and should use these protections to both
act and speak in keeping with their conscience and without the fear of losing
their employment as a result.
The problem of hospital mergers and restriction of reproductive services is
far larger than the scope of this article. The Church Amendment's protections
provide a remedy for doctors who wish to maintain pro-choice views or
perform abortions at private clinics while adhering to the restrictions of the
religious hospitals in which they work. Unfortunately, this is merely a remedy
to one small problem within a far larger web of difficulties. The growing
restrictions on access to legal health care services have created problems for
men, women, patients, and health care professionals. Such problems must be
addressed through litigation, new legislation, and community pressure on a
large scale. However, the protections afforded by the Church Amendment can
help to maintain a community of pro-choice and like-minded individuals at
religious hospitals. Protected pro-choice employees working within sectarian
institutions can, in turn, assist in the overall campaign to force all hospitals to
serve their patients in a responsible and comprehensive way.
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